



# **The economic implications of the Eurozone crisis on Ukraine**

**Identification and quantitative assessment of transmission channels**

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# Structure

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3. Public debt channel
4. Banking channel
5. Economic growth channel
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# 1. Introduction

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- As we argue in our previous Policy Briefing PB/07/2012, the Eurozone crisis that started in spring 2010 in Greece has three components:
  - Public debt crisis
  - Banking crisis
  - Economic growth crisis
- Apart from affecting Eurozone countries, the crisis also poses a major and on-going challenge to neighbouring countries, as economic and financial linkages are strong
- Each component of the crisis has thus potential implications for Ukraine, which has strong links to the EU and the Eurozone
- This policy briefing analyses and assesses these linkages in more detail



## 2. Overview of transmission channels


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- Public debt channel: Financial investors are reluctant to finance low-rated countries
  - Problems in EU-peripheral bond markets makes it more difficult for lower-rated sovereigns to access international capital markets
  - Result: Rise in bond yields and/or lack of market access
- Banking channel: Financial turmoil in Eurozone
  - Eurozone banks are cutting back their exposure abroad in order to improve their balance sheets and concentrate on home markets
- Economic growth channel: Recessions in many Eurozone countries impact economic growth in neighbouring countries via
  - Lower demand for goods from neighbouring countries
  - Less FDI from Eurozone countries into neighbouring countries
  - Lower remittances from Eurozone to neighbouring countries



### 3. Public debt channel: Eurobond yields

#### Eurobond yields




- The public debt crisis in the Eurozone had a negative impact on low-rated sovereigns outside the Eurozone
- Ukraine (Rating: B/B3) recorded high and volatile yields on sovereign bonds issued on foreign markets (Eurobonds), in particular during Q3 2011 – Q2 2012
- A similar picture applies to Belarus, which has the same rating
- However: Russia's (Baa1/investment grade) yield much less affected
- The situation for Ukraine improved from Q3 2012 onwards, as yields came down

**Strong impact on Ukraine's sovereign bond yields on secondary markets, especially from Q3 2011 – Q2 2012**

Source: Cbonds



### 3. Public debt channel: Access to foreign markets




Source: MinFin, own calculations  
\*Issuance as of 16.05.2013

- The crisis-related turbulence on the secondary bond market had also implications for the primary market, i.e. the issuance of new debt
- Indeed, Ukraine was not able to issue Eurobonds at reasonable cost in Q3 2011 - Q2 2012, and thus remained absent from the market
- This was a challenge for policymakers, as other sources of budget finance had to be identified, and/or budget adjustments had to be implemented
- In parallel to the improvement in secondary market yields, Ukraine regained access to the primary market in Q3 2012

**Temporary loss in primary market access during Q3 2011 – Q2 2012**



### 3. Public debt channel: Local bond market



- The local sovereign bond market was not able to de-couple from the developments on external capital markets
- Specifically, the participation of foreigners in the local sovereign bond market more than halved since Jan 2011
- Again, some stabilisation can be observed from Q3 2012 onwards


**The local bond market mirrors the negative developments observed on external markets**

Source: NBU



## 4. Banking channel: Share of EU banks

Ownership structure in banking sector




Source: Raffeisen Bank Aval based on NBU data

- Continuous decrease in market share of non-Russian (i.e. mostly EU) foreign banks, from 40% to 20% of total assets since 2008
- Process started already after global financial crisis, but has been further aggravated by Eurozone crisis developments

**The Eurozone crisis contributed to the ongoing reduction of the market share of EU banks operating in Ukraine**



## 4. Banking channel: External debt of banks




Source: Own calculations based on NBU data, annual reports of banks  
\* IER estimate based on annual reports of largest Russian-owned banks

- Trends described before can be also observed in external debt statistics
- The banking sector continues to repay (net) external debt, a trend that has started in the global financial crisis
- This trend is observed despite the fact that Russian-owned banks increased their respective exposure
- Thus, banking crisis in Eurozone seems to have contributed to the external debt reduction and thus to a reduction in lending capability of the banking sector

**External debt developments are consistent with a picture of a decreasing market share of EU banks in Ukraine**



## 5. Economic growth channel




Source: Eurostat

Note: Forecast for 2013

- Several countries in the Eurozone are currently facing recession
- Economic growth in the Eurozone was negative in 2012
- This situation is likely to continue in 2013, as:
  - Austerity limits the space for fiscal policy
  - Monetary policy, which is already expansionary, is faced with structural headwinds
  - Weak banking sectors limit new lending



## Significant export exposure to EU...



■ Share of merchandise exports to EU in GDP in 2012

Source: COMTRADE, National statistical offices  
Note: Due to lack of data on service exports, only merchandise (i.e. goods) exports are shown

- The EU is an important export market for Ukrainian goods and services, representing 25.1% of total exports
- Given that Ukraine is a very open economy (exports/GDP = 50.9%), exports to the EU amount to a sizeable 12.8% of GDP
- This figure is rather high in a CIS context, if energy exporting countries are excluded

### Significant trade exposure of Ukraine to the EU and to the Eurozone



## ... and close relationship




- The significant trade exposure implies that EU growth dynamics directly affected export flows, as the chart demonstrates
- In 2012, exports to the EU shrank by 3.4% in USD terms
- Exports to other areas were less affected:
  - CIS countries: -1.2%  
(incl. Russia: -6.9%)
  - Asia (excl. CIS): +0.6%
  - Africa: +66.6% (to USD 5.8 bn)

### Negative impact of the Eurozone crisis on Ukraine's exports

Source: Eurostat, Ukrstat



## High exposure to FDI from EU




Source: Moody's Investors Service

- Apart from trade flows, Ukraine is also linked to the EU through investment flows
- Specifically, EU countries are the most important source of FDI in Ukraine, with a share of 81.2% in the country's FDI stock
- This figure probably overstates the true ultimate EU owners, as Cyprus' large share is a special case
- Nevertheless: The overall importance cannot be denied

**This high exposure makes Ukraine vulnerable to negative developments in the Eurozone that may impact the willingness and/or ability of EU firms to invest abroad**



## FDI inflows from EU declined recently




Source: Ukrstat

- Indeed, the turbulences in the Eurozone affected FDI inflows negatively during 2012, as can be clearly seen in the chart
- If we would exclude Cyprus as a special case, the picture would be even more negative, as almost all inflows during 2012 came from Cyprus



# Impact on Remittances



Source: own calculation based on NBU data

\* remittances through formal channels from Germany, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Spain, Netherlands, UK, France, Portugal, Belgium, Poland, Lithuania

- Remittances play an important role in the Ukrainian economy
- Total remittances (incl. via informal channels) are estimated at USD 7.5 bn or 4.3% of GDP in 2012
- Remittances from EU (including informal channels) amounted to USD 2.6 bn in 2012, which represents about 35% of the total
- The relative importance of remittances is particularly strong in some regions of Ukraine, such as Western Ukraine

**The Eurozone crisis led in 2012 to a fall in remittances from the EU by USD 100 m or 5%, when compared to 2011**



## 6. Conclusions

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Eurozone crisis had so far a negative impact on Ukraine through different channels

### 1) Public debt channel

- Volatile yields and restricted access to external capital markets had a negative impact on public debt management and fiscal policy

### 2) Banking channel

- Deleveraging by EU-owned banks contributed to lower banking lending

### 3) Economic growth channel

- Lower exports to EU contributed to current recession in Ukraine
- This is also the case for the reduction in FDI and remittances from the EU

Thus: Eurozone crisis contributed to some extent to the current recession in Ukraine

However: Domestic factors such as an inadequate macro policy mix and a lack of structural reforms are in our view much more important in explaining the current bleak economic situation in Ukraine



## 6. Policy implications

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How should Ukraine react to the Eurozone crisis?

It is necessary to improve economic policy in order to minimise the negative impact

- 1) Public debt channel: More prudent macroeconomic policy → Better sovereign rating → Lower yields and better access to external capital markets
- 2) Banking channel: Better banking regulation and supervision → Good reason for EU-owned banks to maintain business in Ukraine, instead of reducing business
- 3) Economic growth channel: Better business climate → Good reason for EU firms to increase investment in Ukraine, instead of reducing it

### **Overall conclusions:**

- The negative impact of the Eurozone crisis on Ukraine is a fact
- However, domestic economic policy can and should do much better in combating the negative effects of the Eurozone crisis on Ukraine



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